Introduction
To understand sovereign risk, it is necessary to understand borrowers' repayment incentives, or, equivalently, to understand why investors lend to sovereign countries. Since the legal enforcements in the case of sovereign debt are rather weak, repayment incentives should rely on a self-enforcing mechanism. The most obvious mechanism is the loss of reputation that may trigger a ban from future trading in international capital markets. But does this threat deter a country from defaulting?
The early studies in the sovereign debt literature (the classic reference is Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) ) give an affirmative answer to this question in settings where the loss of reputation induces a permanent reversion to autarky (that is, the defaulting country is denied access to capital markets and looses any ability to smooth its expenditures). Bulow and Rogoff (1989) observed that given the recent developments in international capital markets (free entry), it is more realistic to assume that a defaulting country can, to some extend, smooth its expenditures by trading contracts which involve no credit (consumption-insurance contracts). Building on this insight, they provided a celebrated critique to the reputational mechanism by showing that exclusion from borrowing is too weak to sustain any debt repayment. 1 The key assumptions that underpin the rationale of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) 's result are as follows: (1) the sovereign trades at the initial period contingent contracts that 1 We would like to thank the referees for his constructive criticism and suggestions which further helped us to improve the scope and clarity of the paper. We are also grateful to Gaetano Bloise, Felix Kubler and Herakles Polemarchakis for useful comments. Financial support from CNPq is gratefully acknowledged by V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha. Yiannis Vailakis acknowledges the financial support of an ERC starting grant (FP7, Ideas specific program, Project 240983 DCFM) and of an ANR research grant (Project Novo Tempus).
a CNRS and FGV, filipe.econ@gmail.com b U. of Glasgow, Yiannis.Vailakis@glasgow.ac.uk 1 Bulow and Rogoff (1989) led to a vast literature studying alternative mechanisms to answer why countries repay their debts in the absence of sanctions. It includes, among others, Cole and Kehoe (1995) , Cole and Kehoe (1998) , Kletzer and Wright (2000) , Dutta and Kapur (2002) , Kehoe and Perri (2002) , Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) , Krueger and Uhlig (2006) , Amador (2012) , and Popov (2014) . We refer to Wright (2011) and Aguiar and Amador (2014) for a thorough discussion of this literature.
specify the net transfers to foreign investors in all future periods and events, (2) interest rates are higher than growth rates, in the sense that the prices of contingent contracts are such that the present value of the country's future net income is finite, and (3) upon default, the sovereign can purchase any consumption-insurance contract by paying cash in advance. 2 In this setting, the only traded contracts are those compatible with repayment incentives. Therefore, in addition to the investors' break-even condition (or equivalently, the standard Arrow-Debreu present value budget constraint), borrowers face participation constraints requiring that the continuation utility obtained by staying on the contract should be at least as high as that which can be obtained by defaulting and investing in consumption-insurance contracts. 3
The proof of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) is very elegant and powerful. The key insight is that the debt levels associated to a budget feasible consumption contract are bounded by the natural debt limits defined as the present value of future net income. When interest rates are sufficiently high, natural debt limits are well-defined and satisfy the following roll-over property: the natural debt limit at some event is larger that the present value of the natural debt limits at all immediate successor events. This roll-over property together with the access to all consumption-insurance contracts upon default induce strong default incentives that are not compatible with the participation constraints. Indeed, when the ratio of debt to natural debt limit attains its maximum, the sovereign can default and implement a replication strategy using consumption-insurance contracts which improves-at any contingency in which endowment is positive-upon the consumption plan that is subject to debt repayment. This "arbitrage" argument does not require any restriction on preferences except strict monotonicity. But, for the replication policy to be budget feasible, it is essential that-for any contingent contract satisfying the break even condition-the process of sovereign's debt to natural debt limit ratio attains its maximum in finite time. This turns out to be true, for instance, when the sovereign's net income is uniformly bounded from above and away from zero.
The first contribution of this paper is to provide examples to show that under the general assumptions Bulow and Rogoff (1989) impose on primitives, there are some contingent contracts for which the maximum expansion of debt relative to natural debt limits is not achieved in finite time. We provide examples to show that this may happen in the plausible scenarios where the net income of the sovereign vanishes along a path of successive low productivity shocks (even if the probability of this path is zero), or when it grows unboundedly along a path of successive high productivity shocks. For these examples, the proof proposed by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) does not go through.
goff (1989)'s unsustainable debt result. 4 Their argument does not require any restriction on the net income process but it makes use of a characterization result of self-enforcing debt limits that requires additional assumptions on preferences. In particular, preferences are assumed to be additively separable and the Bernoulli function to be strictly concave, differentiable and bounded.
The second contribution of this paper amounts to show that the result in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) holds in full generality, free of any assumption imposed on the net income process or on preferences (apart from strict monotonicity). 5 We also show that, if preferences are dynamically consistent, its sequentially complete markets analogue proved in Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) follows as a direct corollary of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) 's original result.
Our proof shares some similarities with the one proposed in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) . We also show for any budget feasible contingent contract involving some liabilities, there always exists an event at which the sovereign can default and initiate a replication strategy based on consumption-insurance contracts that improves upon the consumption plan that is subject to debt repayment. However, our approach differentiates from Bulow and Rogoff (1989) in two aspects: the date the country has incentives to default and the replication strategy that is implemented.
The layout of the paper is as follows. To get a more precise idea on how our approach differentiates from the one proposed in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) we study in Section 2 a simple environment where the sovereign faces risk neutral foreign investors and there is no uncertainty. Section 3 describes the general environment. Section 4 presents the result in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and shows the limitations of their approach. Our main result is proven in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a discussion on related issues.
The illustrating case: No uncertainty and risk-neutral investors
In this case, the price (in terms of time-0 consumption) of a contract delivering one unit of the good at period t is (1+r) −t where r is the world interest rate. Let y = (y t ) t≥0 be the country's net income and denote by c = (c t ) t≥0 the consumption sequence implemented by a contingent contract. Consider the sequence of the associated debt levels D = (D t ) t≥0 where D t is defined as the date-t present value of future net transfers z s := y s − c s for every s ≥ t. Budget feasibility and the assumption of high interest rates imply that D t is lower than the natural debt limit N t defined as the present value of future net income. trade sequentially a complete set of contingent bonds with self-enforcing debt limits in place of participation constraints. It is the same environment as in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) but with a different default option. In addition, they show that the risk-neutrality assumption and the ad-hoc separation between a small open economy and investors with "deep pockets" play no role in the impossibility result of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) . The key issue and what differentiates our approach from Bulow and Rogoff (1989) is the way we identify the date at which the country has incentives to default.
2.1. The approach in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) We let κ be the supremum over all dates t of the debt to natural debt limit ratio D t /N t . If we assume that the contingent contract involves some positive level of debt at some date, then we must have κ > 0. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show that the sovereign has incentives to default (i.e., the contract violates the participation constraint) at any date s satisfying D s ≥ κ(N s − y s ). 7 To understand why, first observe that the present value (1 + r) −1 κN s+1 is lower than the current debt D s . This is true since N s − y s = (1 + r) −1 N s+1 . This in turn implies that, instead of complying with the terms of the contract by making the net transfer D s − (1 + r) −1 D s+1 to foreign investors, the country can default at date s, consumec s := c s + D s − (1 + r) −1 κN s+1 and save the difference
The definition of κ implies that θ s ≥ 0. At date s + 1, the return (1 + r)θ s = κN s+1 − D s+1 on previous savings allows to implement the consumptionc s+1 := c s+1 + κy s+1 and save the amount
Similarly, the definition of κ implies θ s+1 ≥ 0. Recursively, we can show that, at any date s + t, the return κN s+t − D s+t on previous savings allows to implement consumptioñ c s+t := c s+t + κy s+t and save the amount (1 + r) −1 [κN s+t+1 − D s+t+1 ]. This means that the consumption (c s+t ) t≥0 after date s can be implemented only through savings. Sincec s+t ≥ c s+t for every t ≥ 0 with a strict inequality for some t, this contradicts the participation constraint at date s and the sovereign has incentives to default on the terms of the contract.
Our approach
It is useful to first recall the concept of exact roll-over introduced by Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) : a sequence (M t ) t≥0 is said to satisfy exact roll-over if the time-0 discounted value (1 + r) −t M t is constant, or equivalently, if
We show that it is possible to find a positive sequence M = (M t ) t≥0 satisfying exact roll-over, and a date τ such that D τ > M τ and D t ≤ M t for every t > τ . Once we have identified the sequence M and the date τ satisfying the above conditions, it is straightforward to see that the country prefers to default at date τ . Indeed, instead of paying D τ − (1 + r) −1 D τ +1 to foreign investors, the country can save
The problem is that such a date s may not exist under the general conditions Bulow and Rogoff (1989) impose on primitives. See Section 4 for details.
8 Recall that ys = cs + Ds − (1 + r) −1 Ds+1.
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to implement the consumption c τ +1 and save the difference
Recursively, we can show that for any t > τ , the country implements the consumption c t using the return M t − D t of previous savings and saving
This implies that the country is strictly better off defaulting at date τ since it can enjoy the extra consumption D τ − M τ at that date without decreasing consumption at all subsequent periods. The existence of the exact roll-over sequence (M t ) t≥0 and of a date τ satisfying D τ > M τ and D t ≤ M t for every t > τ , follows from the property that the time-0 present value (1 + r) −t N t of the natural debt limit converges by assumption to zero. The formal details are presented in Section 5.
The general model
We consider a country whose government makes investment and consumption decisions over an infinite horizon. There is one good that can be either consumed in the same period, or invested as capital for the next period. The production technology is subject to random shocks. We use an event tree Σ to describe time, uncertainty and the revelation of information over the infinite horizon (time and uncertainty are both discrete).
Uncertainty
There is a unique initial date-0 event s 0 ∈ Σ and for each date t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} there is a finite set S t ⊂ Σ of date-t events s t . Each s t has a unique predecessor σ(s t ) in S t−1 and a finite number of successors s t+1 ∈ S t+1 for which σ(s t+1 ) = s t . We use the notation s t+1 s t to specify that s t+1 is a successor of s t . Event s t+τ is said to follow event s t , also denoted s t+τ s t , if σ (τ ) (s t+τ ) = s t . The set S t+τ (s t ) := {s t+τ ∈ S t+τ : s t+τ s t } denotes the collection of all date-(t+τ ) events following s t . Abusing notation, we let S t (s t ) := {s t }. The subtree of all events starting from s t is then
We use the notation s τ s t when s τ s t or s τ = s t . In particular, we have Σ(s t ) = {s τ ∈ Σ : s τ s t }.
Consumption and preferences
If k(s t ) ≥ 0 is the investment on capital at date-t event s t , then the country's production at every successor event s t+1 s t is denoted by f (s t+1 , k(s t )). We do not impose any restriction on the production function f (s t , ·). A standard example is the neoclassical production technology f (s t , k) = A(s t )k α + (1 − δ)k where uncertainty only affects the total factor productivity A(s t ).
We denote by y = (y(s t )) s t ∈Σ the net income (or endowment) process derived from the capital investment k = (k(s t )) s t ∈Σ and defined by
where k(s 0 ) > 0 is exogenously fixed. We follow Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and assume that current investment in capital is deduced from current production.
Assumption 1 For every event s t we have y(s t ) ≥ 0.
The country can finance investment and consumption by trading a state contingent contract z = (z(s t )) s t ∈Σ where z(s t ) specifies the net transfer from the country to foreign investors. Negative z(s t ) indicates a payment from investors to the country. The consumption process c ≥ 0 associated to the contract z is then given by c(s
At any event s t , the country's preference relation over consumption c is defined by a "contingent utility function" U (c|s t ). Following Bulow and Rogoff (1989) we only restrict preference relations to be strictly increasing.
Assumption 2 For every event s t , the function c → U (c|s t ) is strictly increasing with respect to the consumption c(s τ ) at any successor event s τ s t .
Remark 3.1 The above assumption is very general. It allows to encompass preference relations that are not necessarily additively separable. In particular, it holds true when preferences satisfy the general recursive functional form
where the intertemporal aggregator W : R 2 → R is strictly increasing and the event s t certainty equivalent M s t ((U (c|s t+1 )) s t+1 s t ) of future continuation utility U (c|s t+1 ) is also strictly increasing. If preference relations are additively separable, in the sense that
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and π(s t+τ |s t ) is the conditional probability of s t+τ given s t , then Assumption 2 is satisfied if the Bernoulli function u is strictly increasing. Observe that we do not need to assume that u is concave, differentiable or bounded.
Markets
We denote by q(s t+1 ) the price, in terms of event s t consumption, of the s t+1 -contingent bond. Given bond prices q = (q(s t )) s t s 0 we denote by p(s t ) the associated date-0 price of consumption at s t defined recursively by p(s 0 ) = 1 and p(s t ) = q(s t )p(σ(s t )) for every s t s 0 . We use PV(x|s t ) to denote the present value at date-t event s t of a process x restricted to the subtree Σ(s t ) and defined by PV(x|s
Following Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3 The present value of the country's future net income is finite, i.e., PV(y|s 0 ) < ∞.
Remark 3.2 We could assume, as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , that foreign investors are risk-neutral. In this case,
where r would be the world interest rate and π(s t+1 |s t ) the conditional probability of s t+1 given s t . However, the risk-neutrality assumption and the ad-hoc separation between a small open economy and investors with "deep pockets" play no role in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) 's analysis. The mechanism underlying their unsustainable debt result is valid even if we consider a general equilibrium version of their model where all agents are treated symmetrically (implying that lenders and borrowers are determined endogenously).
Foreign investors are willing to provide any state-contingent claim z if they break-even in present value terms, i.e., 9
Given that the country's future net income has finite present value, the break-even condition (3.1) is equivalent to the standard Arrow-Debreu present value budget constraint PV(c|s 0 ) ≤ PV(y|s 0 ). In particular, we have the equivalent sequential formulation: for every s t s 0 ,
where a(s t+1 ) := PV(c − y|s t+1 ) is the country's holding of the bond issued at event s t and contingent to the successor event s t+1 . 10
9 Observe that this condition restricts feasible contracts z to be such that the series PV(z|s 0 ) is welldefined. 10 The term a(s 0 ) can be interpreted as an initial transfer.
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Since consumption is non-negative, the bond holding process satisfies the natural debt limit constraint, i.e,
Observe that the country's outstanding debt D(s t ) := PV(z|s t ) at event s t satisfies D(s t ) = −a(s t ). In particular, the debt D(s t ) must not exceed the value of a claim to the country's entire future net income stream, i.e., D(s t ) ≤ N (s t ).
Self-enforcing contracts
A state-contingent contract z involves debt repayment if PV(z|s t ) > 0 for some event s t . The country keeps the promises associated to contract z if, and only if, for every event s t , the continuation utility U (c|s t ) associated to the consumption c = y − z is not lower than the maximum utility V (s t ) the country would get by defaulting. Following Bulow and Rogoff (1989) we assume that after default, the country is excluded from borrowing but keeps the ability to save by investing in a complete set of one-period contingent bonds. 11 This implies that the value V (s t ) of the default option is the largest continuation utility U (c|s t ) wherec is financed by a processã of non-negative bond holdings, i.e.,
whereã(s t ) = 0 andã(s τ ) ≥ 0 for every strict successor s τ s t . A contract z is said to be self-enforcing if the incentive compatibility constraint
is satisfied for every event s t ∈ Σ.
Bulow and Rogoff (1989)'s result
Consider a contract z satisfying the break-even condition (3.1). Bulow and Rogoff (1989) propose to show that if z involves positive levels of debt, i.e., PV(z|s τ ) > 0 for some event s τ in Σ, then it cannot satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints (3.4).
To state formally their claim, we need to introduce the following notation. Let κ(z) ∈ [0, 1] be the lowest number satisfying PV(z|s t ) ≤ κ(z) PV(y|s t ) for every s t . Such number exists because z ≤ y (consumption c is non-negative) and the present value of net income is finite (which implies that PV(z|s t ) ≤ PV(y|s t ) for every event s t ).
Proposition 4.1 (Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , Theorem 1) Consider a contract z satisfying the break-even condition (3.1). Assume the following condition is satisfied
If the contract z involves some positive level of debt, then it cannot be self-enforcing (i.e., it must violate the incentive compatibility constraint (3.4)). Bulow and Rogoff (1989) assume implicitly that condition (BR) is satisfied. Eaton and Fernandez (1995) claim that this condition follows from the definition of κ(z). Observe that an alternative definition of κ(z) is κ(z) := sup
where κ(z|s t ) ∈ [0, 1] is defined by the equation PV(z|s t ) = κ(z|s t ) PV(y|s t ). 12 If the supremum in the definition of κ(z) is attained at some event s t where the net income y(s t ) is strictly positive, then (BR) is satisfied (with a strict inequality). There are also other conditions under which (BR) is satisfied.
Proposition 4.2 Assume that foreign investors are risk-neutral, i.e., p(s t ) = γ t π(s t ) where π(s t ) is the unconditional probability of event s t and γ = (1 + r) −1 where r > 0 is the risk-free interest rate. Assume moreover that there exist y h > y l > 0 such that y(s t ) ∈ [y l , y h ] for any event s t . Then, for any contract z satisfying the break-even condition (3.1), condition (BR) is satisfied.
Proof: For any s t ∈ Σ we have
where ε := (1 − γ)y l /y h . This implies that
Therefore, there must exist some event s t such that PV(
Otherwise we get that PV(z|s t ) ≤ κ(z)[1 − ε] PV(y|s t ) for all s t ∈ Σ which contradicts the definition of κ(z).
Q.E.D.
If the net income process is not bounded away from zero, or, it is unbounded from above, then a contract satisfying the break-even condition does not necessarily satisfy condition (BR). To prove our claim, we first provide an example of an economy for which the net income process may vanish along a path of successive negative shocks.
Example 4.1 At every date t, a shock s t ∈ { , h} realizes. The initial event is s 0 = and a date-t event s t is a history of shocks, s t = (s 1 , . . . , s t ). A following event s t+1 s t can be written as s t+1 = (s t , s t+1 ) with s t+1 ∈ { , h}. The net income process of the country is defined by y(s 0 ) := y l and y(s t , s t+1 ) := y h if s t+1 = h αy(s t ) if s t+1 = where α ∈ (0, 1) and y h > y l > 0. The conditional probability π(s t+1 |s t ) is defined as follows:
After a good shock s t = h at date t, the country's endowment switches to its high level y h and remains high forever. After a bad shock s t = , the country's endowment is reduced by a fraction α. A good shock can be interpreted as innovation that allows to sustain a high productivity level. Foreign investors are risk-neutral. That is, at every event s t , we have p(s t ) = γ t π(s t ) where γ = (1 + r) −1 and the risk-free interest rate r is positive. The price of the bond contingent to next-period shock s t+1 is given by q(s t+1 ) = π(s t+1 |s t )/(1 + r).
We denote by t the history of successive negative shocks ( , , . . . , ) up to date t. Consider the process λ = (λ(s t )) s t ∈Σ where λ(s t ) = 0 if s t = t and λ( t ) = κ t ∈ (0, 1) where (κ t ) t∈N is an increasing sequence of positive numbers satisfying lim t→∞ κ t = 1. Given the process λ, we can construct a contract z satisfying 13 (4.1) PV(z|s t ) = λ(s t ) PV(y|s t ).
Observe that κ(z|s t ) = λ(s t ). This implies that
and κ(z|s t ) < κ(z) for every event s t . In particular, the supremum κ(z) is not attained in finite time.
Proposition 4.3 For the economy considered in Example 4.1, the contingent contract z defined by Equation (4.1) does not satisfy condition (BR), i.e.,
Proof: Given that PV(z|s t ) = λ(s t ) PV(y|s t ), we have to show that
This is obvious if s t = t since λ(s t ) = 0. To show that Equation (4.2) is valid for s t = t , observe that
Moreover, λ( t ) = κ t and y( t ) = α t y l . Therefore, Equation (4.2) is satisfied if
It is always possible to choose the sequence (κ t ) t∈N such that Equation (4.3) is satisfied. Take for instance κ t = µ/(α t + µ) where
In Example 4.1, we have exploited the fact that the process of net income is not uniformly bounded away from zero to show that a contingent contract satisfying the break-even condition (3.1) does not necessarily satisfy condition (BR). As suggested in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) (Footnote 5), we can replace the process y by a larger process y ≥ y that also has finite present value (i.e., PV(y |s t ) < ∞). Consider the special case where foreign investors are risk-neutral. Given the result of Proposition 4.2, it sounds reasonable to let y (s t ) := y(s t ) + 1. We get a process that is bounded away from zero. However, if foreign investors are not risk-neutral, it is not clear how the process y could be increased to some y such that any contingent contract z satisfying the break-even condition (3.1) would also satisfy condition (BR). More importantly, the process y may still be unbounded from above. We show next that, even if the process of net income is uniformly bounded away from zero, then a contract satisfying the break-even condition does not necessarily satisfy condition (BR).
Proposition 4.4 Consider the same economy as in Example 4.1 except that the net income process is now defined as follows:
where g ∈ (0, r). The contract z defined by Equation (4.1) does not satisfy condition (BR), i.e., ∀s t ∈ Σ, PV(z|sProof: It suffices to show that Equation (4.2) is valid for s t = t . Observe that
where χ := (1 + g)/(1 + r) < 1. Moreover, λ( t ) = κ t and y( t ) = 1. Therefore, Equation (4.2) is satisfied if
It is always possible to choose the sequence (κ t ) t∈N such that Equation (4.4) is satisfied. Take for instance κ t = µ/((1 + g) −t + µ) where µ < γ(1 − π l )(1 + g)/(1 − χ). Q.E.D.
The general result
The main contribution of this paper is to show that condition (BR) is superfluous for the validity of the result stated in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) .
Theorem 5.1 Consider a contract z satisfying the break-even condition (3.1). If the contract z involves some positive level of debt, i.e., PV(z|s t ) > 0 for some event s t , then there exists a successor event s τ s t for which the incentive compatibility constraint U (c|s τ ) ≥ V (s τ ) is not satisfied.
Before we proceed to prove the general result, we find it useful to illustrate how our approach applies to the deterministic case.
Proof for the deterministic case: Assume that the country's net income is deterministic. We then replace the notation s t by t. In particular, the country's net income is now a sequence (y t ) t≥0 . Fix z = (z t ) t≥0 a contract satisfying the break-even condition (3.1) and denote by D = (D t ) t≥0 the associated sequence of debt levels defined by D t := PV(z|t). The consumption c := y − z can be financed by the sequential trading of one period contingent bonds since we have
It is important to observe that D t ≤ N t where N t is the natural debt limit defined by N t := PV(y|t). Assume there exists a date ξ ≥ 0 such that D ξ > 0. Since we assume that the country's future net income is finite, we have lim t→∞ p t N t = 0. This implies that there exists a sufficiently large time period η > ξ such that p ξ D ξ > p η N η . Let τ be the largest time period in {ξ, . . . , η} satisfying
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We claim that
If t ≤ η, this follows from the definition of τ . If t > η, this follows from the following inequalities 14
Adding p η N η on both sides of the flow constraints (5.1) for any t ≥ τ , we get
and for every t > τ
If we let (ã t ) t>τ be defined by
then we get that c τ + δ + q τ +1ãτ +1 = y τ and for every t > τ c t + q t+1ãt+1 = y t +ã t .
The inequality (5.2) implies that δ > 0. The inequality (5.3) implies thatã t ≥ 0 for every t > τ . It follows that if the sovereign defaults at date τ , he succeeds to finance the consumption sequence (c τ + δ, c τ +1 , . . .) by a sequence of non-negative bond holdings (ã) t>τ . This means that V (τ ) > U (c|τ ) and z cannot be incentive compatible. Q.E.D.
Remark 5.1 Eaton and Fernandez (1995) propose a different proof for the deterministic case. They show that the sovereign has incentives to default at the date s for which the debt is maximum. To ensure that the sequence (D t ) t≥0 admits a maximum, they assume that the sequence (PV(y|t)) t≥0 is bounded. 15 This is stronger that the assumption imposed by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) who only assume that the value PV(y|t) of future net income discounted to any time t is finite. Indeed, assume that there is growth, say y t = (1 + g) t where g < r. Since interest rates are higher than growth rates, we get that PV(y|t) = (1 + g) t /(1 − χ) where χ := (1 + g)/(1 + r). The assumption in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) is then satisfied but we have lim t→∞ PV(y|t) = ∞.
We now provide the details of the proof for the general environment where net income is stochastic.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: Let z be a contract satisfying the break-even condition (3.1). We let D(s t ) := PV(z|s t ) for each date-t event s t ∈ Σ. Since z = y − c where the consumption process c is non-negative, we deduce that D(s t ) ≤ N (s t ) where N (s t ) := PV(y|s t ) is the natural debt limit.
Fix an arbitrary date η ∈ N and let M η = (M η (s t )) s t ∈Σ be a process satisfying the following properties.
(i) The process M η satisfies exact roll-over in the sense that
(ii) For every date-η event s η ∈ S η , we have M η (s η ) = N (s η ).
(iii) For every t > η and every event s t ∈ S t , we have M η (s t ) ≥ N (s t ).
Remark 5.2 Such a process always exists. Indeed, first pose M η (s η ) := N (s η ) for every date-η event s η . Second, the exact roll-over condition (ER) defines in a unique way the process M η (s t ) at every event s t with t < η. Third, we know that
. We can then let M η (s η+2 ) := N (s η+2 ) + ε(s η+2 ). Proceeding by induction, we can define M η (s t ) at every node s t where t > η such that (i) and (iii) are satisfied.
Assume that there exists a date-ξ event s ξ such that D(s ξ ) > 0. Exact roll-over of M t implies that for every t > ξ we have 16
Since the present value of the country's future net income is finite, we have
Therefore, the set
must be non-empty. Let us denote by η the smallest element of the above set. We do have
Claim 5.1 There exists a date τ ≤ η and an event σ τ s ξ such that
Proof: Let T be the set of dates defined by
This set is non-empty since it contains ξ. Let τ be the largest element of T and σ τ be any element of
We prove now property (b). Fix an arbitrary s t σ τ . If t ≤ η, then by the definition of date τ , we must have
Q.E.D.
We claim that the sovereign has incentives to default at the event σ τ . Indeed, if the sovereign honors the contract z, then the associated consumption process c := y − z has to satisfy the following flow constraints
Suppose that, instead of fulfilling its promises, the sovereign chooses to default at event σ τ . He can then increase its consumption by D(σ τ ) − M η (σ τ ) > 0 at event σ τ and opt for the asset holdingã(
and recalling that M η satisfies exact roll-over, we havẽ
That is, the sovereign can enjoy higher (due to property (a)) consumption at the event σ τ . Posingc(s t ) = c(s t ) for every strict successor s t σ τ , we also have that
That is, the sovereign can support through savings (due to property (b) and the fact that M η satisfies exact roll-over) the consumptionc(s t ) = c(s t ) specified by the contract z at all successor events s t σ τ . It follows that
and the incentive compatibility constraint is not satisfied at σ τ . Q.E.D.
Discussions

Capital adjustment after default
In the definition of the default option V (s t ), we have assumed that the country does not modify its investment on the out-of-equilibrium path corresponding to default. This is an ad-hoc restriction and we should replace V (s t ) by the higher opportunity cost W (s t ) defined as the largest continuation utility U (c|s t ) wherec is financed by a processã of non-negative bond holdings and a processk of capital investment, i.e., (6.1) ∀s
wherek(s t−1 ) = k(s t−1 ),ã(s t ) = 0 andã(s τ ) ≥ 0 for every strict successor s τ s t .
If a contract z satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints with respect to W (s t ) then z also satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints with respect to V (s t ). Therefore, since debt cannot be sustained when the outside option is V (s t ), it can neither be sustained when the outside option is W (s t ). Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) assumed that, after default, the sovereign can neither access international saving markets, nor modify its investment on capital. This leads to "strong" autarky where U (y|s t ) is the default option. This punishment turns out to be severe enough to sustain some level of debt. However, it is unrealistic to consider that the sovereign cannot modify its investment on capital after default. In the environment where a defaulting agent is excluded from borrowing and saving, we should then consider the default option R(s t ) defined as the largest continuation utility U (c|s t ) wherec is solely financed by a process k of capital investment, i.e.,
wherek(s t−1 ) = k(s t−1 ). Rosenthal (1991) showed that when productivity is deterministic and subject to additional conditions on the initial capital holding, debt is never sustained under the default option R(s t ).
Negative net income
To simplify the presentation, we have followed Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and assumed that current investment in capital is deduced from current production, i.e., the net income y(s t ) := f (s t , k(s t−1 )) − k(s t ) is non-negative. We can handle the general case where net income can be negative at some events if we strengthen Assumption 3 by requiring that (6.3) PV(y + |s t ) < ∞ where y + (s t ) := max{y(s t ), 0} is the positive part of y(s t ). To see how the proof of Theorem 5.1 can be amended to handle the general case, pose N (s t ) := PV(y + |s t ) and We follow Section III.B in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and analyze debt repayment incentives when, in addition to the exclusion from borrowing, the defaulting country looses a part of its net income. 17 Formally, if the country defaults at event s t , we denote by (s τ ) ∈ [0, y(s τ )] the loss of net income suffered at every event s τ s t . The default option V (s t ) is then replaced by V (s t ) defined as the largest continuation utility U (c|s t ) wherec is financed by a processã of non-negative bond holdings and where net income
whereã(s t ) = 0 andã(s τ ) ≥ 0 for every strict successor s τ s t .
Similarly to Theorem 2 in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , we get as a direct corollary of Theorem 5.1 that debt can be sustained when default entails some loss of net income, but up to a level that does not exceed the present value of the loss.
Corollary 6.1 Consider a contract z = y −c satisfying the break-even condition (3.1). If the debt level at some event s t is strictly larger than the present value of the loss of net income, i.e.,
PV(z|s
then there exists a successor event s τ s t for which the incentive compatibility constraint
Proof: Consider a contract z satisfying the break-even condition (3.1) and denote by c := y − z the associated consumption process. Assume there exists an event s t s 0 such that PV(z|s t ) > PV( |s t ). Letz be the contract defined on the subtree Σ(s t ) bỹ z(s τ ) := z(s τ ) − (s τ ) for every s τ s t . Observe thatz =ỹ − c on the subtree Σ(s t ) and PV(z|s t ) > 0. We can apply Theorem 5.1 for the economy defined on the subtree Σ(s t ) with net incomeỹ and conclude that one of the participation constraints U (c|s τ ) ≥ V (s τ ) for s τ in the subtree Σ(s t ) is not satisfied.
6.4. Self-enforcing and not-too-tight debt limits
We have argued that the environment in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) can be interpreted as the analogue of Kehoe and Levine (1993) (i.e., constrained Arrow-Debreu contingent markets) but with a different default punishment. 18 Alvarez and Jermann (2000) proposed a sequential formulation of Kehoe and Levine (1993) . Instead of assuming that agents can trade any contingent contract at the initial date, they consider an environment where agents trade sequentially a complete set of one period contingent bonds (Arrow securities). In this setting, the Arrow-Debreu present value constraint is replaced by a sequence of flow constraints, while the participation constraints are replaced by agent-specific debt limits that are compatible with maximal risk sharing subject to debt repayment being individually rational. Such limits on borrowing are referred in the literature as not-too-tight (self-enforcing) debt limits.
Formally, a non-negative process A = (A(s t )) s t ∈Σ is said to be not-too-tight when
where, given an initial financial claim b at event s t , the value J(A, b|s t ) is the largest continuation utility U (c|s t ) where c is financed by a process a of bond holdings satisfying
Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) proved that if A is not-too-tight and bounded from above by the natural debt limits N , then we must have A = 0. 19 We propose to show that this result can be substantially generalized as a direct corollary of Theorem 5.1 provided that preferences, in addition of being strictly increasing, are assumed to be dynamically consistent.
Definition 6.1 Preferences are said to be dynamically consistent if for every event s t ∈ Σ, for every consumption processes c andc, the following conditions
In Bulow and Rogoff (1989) the outside option is V (s t ) which is larger than the autarchic outside option U (y|s t ) considered in Kehoe and Levine (1993) . 19 See Proposition 3 in Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009). Remark 6.2 We can adapt in a straightforward manner the above proof to show that the assumption "A is non-negative and bounded by the natural debt limits N " can be replaced by: A(s 0 ) ≥ 0 and the process A satisfies the following transversality condition:
We propose to extend the analysis by allowing the continuation utility after default at event s t be some arbitrary number W (s t ). The two polar examples are: W (s t ) = V (s t ) as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) or Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) , and W (s t ) = U (y|s t ) as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) or Alvarez and Jermann (2000) . We may also consider many other punishments, like temporary exclusion as analyzed by Azariadis and Kaas (2013) .
If the default punishment is stronger (in the sense that W (s t ) ≤ V (s t )), one expect that some level of self-enforcing debt can be sustained at equilibrium. However, it follows as a direct corollary of Theorem 5.1 that the maximum level of self-enforcing debt is unique.
Proposition 6.2 Suppose that preferences are dynamically consistent and strictly increasing. If A and A are two processes of non-negative, not-too-tight debt limits that are bounded by the natural debt limits N , then A = A .
Proof: We only prove that A(s 0 ) = A (s 0 ). The result for an arbitrary event s t can be obtained replacing the whole tree Σ by the subtree Σ(s t ). We can assume without any loss of generality that A(s 0 ) ≥ A (s 0 ). We let y be the process defined by y (s t ) := y(s t ) − A (s t ) + s t+1 s t q(s t+1 )A (s t+1 ).
Fix an event s t and let (c , a ) be an optimal plan in the set d(A , −A (s t )|s t ). Since c (s t ) ≥ 0, we must have y (s t ) ≥ 0. We denote by E the economy where the income process y is replaced by y . Observe that the plan (c , a + A ) belongs to the set d (0, 0|s t ) where d is the demand of the economy E . In particular, we have W (s t ) = V (s t ) where V (s t ) := J (0, 0|s t ) is the Bulow-Rogoff's default continuation utility in the economy E . It follows from a straightforward translation invariance of the budget constraints (5.1) that the process D := A − A satisfies J(A, −A(s t )|s t ) = J (D, −D(s t )|s t ), for all s t .
Even if D is not necessarily non-negative, the right-hand side of the above inequality is well-defined. Observe that the above equality means that D is not-too-tight in the economy E . Moreover, D satisfies the conditions of Remark 6.2 since D(s 0 ) ≥ 0 and |D| ≤ 2N . We can then apply Proposition 6.1 to get that D(s 0 ) = 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6.2 extends Proposition 3 in Bidian and Bejan (2015) in the same way Proposition 6.1 extends Proposition 3 in Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) . Since these results follow from an arbitrage argument, we do not need to assume that preferences are additively separable with a strictly concave and differentiable Bernoulli function. We only assume preference relations to be dynamically consistent and strictly increasing.
Conclusion
To prove their well-known sovereign debt paradox, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) follow a replication policy: when debt repayment is feasible, the same consumption plan can be replicated subject to no borrowing, which reveals an incentive to default. However, this replication policy has to be initiated at the maximum expansion of debt relative to natural debt limit. We show, by means of examples, that there may exist contingent contracts for which the maximum of this ratio might not be achieved at any contingency, and Bulow and Rogoff (1989) 's proof fails. We provide an alternative argument which unconditionally restores the validity of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) 's impossibility theorem.
